Transcendentality and nothingness in Sartre’s atheistic ontology by Leung, King-Ho
 1 




This article offers a reading of Sartre’s phenomenological ontology in light of the pre-
modern understanding of ‘transcendentals’ as universal properties and predicates of all 
determinate beings. Drawing on Sartre’s transcendental account of nothingness in his 
early critique of Husserl as well as his discussion of ‘determination as negation’ in 
Being and Nothingness, this article argues that Sartre’s universal predicate of ‘the not’ 
(le non) could be understood in a similar light to the medieval scholastic conception of 
transcendentals. But whereas the scholastics saw the transcendental properties of 
oneness, truth, and goodness as reflections of God’s divine perfections, Sartre’s 
predicate of the ‘not’ operates as an atheistic transcendental which signifies the non-
being of God – that God is not. By comparing Sartre’s phenomenological ontology to 
medieval theological metaphysics, this article not only highlights the atheist 
underpinnings of Sartre’s entire ontological schema in Being and Nothingness but also 
offers a new way of interpreting Sartre as a systematic transcendental metaphysician. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
In her influential article ‘Sartre and Negative Theology’, Christina Howells (1981) highlighted 
some remarkable parallels between Jean-Paul Sartre’s controversial account of ‘nothingness’ 
(néant) and the mystical conception of God. In light of Howell’s insightful observation, recent 
scholarship has further explored Sartre’s relation – and possible debt – to mystical theology 
(see Kirkpatrick, 2018; Pattison and Kirkpatrick, 2018, pp. 97–125; Kirkpatrick, 2017).1 
Building on these fruitful engagements with Sartre, this article presents a comparison between 
Sartre’s atheistic ontology and the Christian theological tradition.2 However, unlike recent 
‘mystical’ readings of Sartre, this article offers a new interpretation of Sartre’s account of 
 
1 See also Iris Murdoch’s (1999) Existentialists and Mystics, whose title suggests an intuitive connection between 
Sartrean existentialism and religious mysticism. 
2 The focus of this article is on Sartre’s earlier (‘pre-Marxist’) work on phenomenological ontology. On the 
religious and theological elements in Sartre’s later (more political) works such as Saint Genet and Critique of 
Dialectical Reason, see King (1974, pp. 103–191). 
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nothingness not in relation to the mystics but to the scholastics – especially the scholastic 
conception of the transcendentals.3 
By comparing Sartre’s ‘transcendental’ conception of nothingness to medieval 
accounts of transcendentality in scholastic theological metaphysics, this article puts forward a 
new interpretation of the notion of ‘the not’ (le non) which Sartre presents as a transcendental 
condition in his account of determination as negation in Being and Nothingness (hereafter cited 
as BN).4 In particular, this article argues that Sartre’s notion of nothingness plays a similar role 
in his atheistic ontology to that of the transcendentals in medieval theology: that Sartre’s notion 
of nothingness operates as an atheistic account of transcendentality which signifies the absence 
or even death of God.5 To do so, this article firstly examines the notion of ‘transcendentality’ 
in relation to Sartre’s early critique of Husserl, it then offers a reading of Sartre’s account of 
‘the not’ in his discussion of ‘determination as negation’ as well as his so-called ‘ontological 
proof’ in Being and Nothingness in comparison to the theological conception of transcendental 
properties in medieval scholastic metaphysics. Finally, the article concludes by showing how 
Sartre’s avowed commitment to atheism underlies both his formulation of transcendental 
consciousness in terms of ‘nothingness’ and his universal predication of ‘the not’ as a 
transcendental property of all determinate being. 
By way of treating Sartre’s remarks on ‘the not’ as a universal predicate and his account 
of omnis determinatio est negatio as a speculative metaphysical thesis (following Spinoza and 
Hegel),6 this article seeks to shed new light on Sartre’s ontological account of nothingness and 
negation which is often overlooked or ridiculed in the Anglo-American reception of Sartre (as 
 
3 Indeed, as Howells (1981, p. 550) points out: ‘Throughout his writings, when discussing the notion of God, 
Sartre contrives to examine only the scholastic conception of Absolute Being.’ 
4 Unless otherwise stated, quotations from BN are taken Sarah Richmond’s recent translation. References given 
below in the form, e.g., ‘BN, p. 301/239/253’, are first to Richmond’s translation (Sartre, 2020), second to Hazel 
Barnes’ earlier translation (Sartre, 2003), and third to the original French edition (Sartre, 1943). 
5 In 1943, the same year in which Being and Nothingness was released, Sartre published a review of Georges 
Bataille’s Inner Experience which was Sartre’s first publication that directly mentions ‘the death of God’. See 
Sartre (2010a); see also Gillespie (2016, especially pp. 44–46). 
6 For a discussion of what Hegel and Spinoza respectively meant by this statement, see Stern (2016). 
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notably found in A. J. Ayer’s critique of Being and Nothingness, which will be briefly 
discussed below). 7  By considering Sartre as a ‘transcendental’ philosopher not just in a 
(post-)Kantian idealist sense but in a pre-Kantian scholastic metaphysical guise,8 this article 
seeks to contribute to the recent discussions of the question of ‘God’ in Sartre’s works,9 as well 
as the reassessment of Sartre’s relation to the tradition of transcendental philosophy and the 
history of metaphysics more broadly.10  
  
2. Reconsidering the transcendental 
Before considering Sartre’s account of nothingness and ‘the not’ in Being and Nothingness, it 
is worth examining Sartre’s earlier discussion of transcendentality in his critique of Husserlian 
phenomenology in his 1936 essay The Transcendence of the Ego, published seven years before 
Being and Nothingness.11 Contrary to Husserl’s postulation of a transcendental I which unifies 
and personalises conscious experience, in this early essay Sartre (1972, p. 38) argues that 
‘phenomenology does not need to appeal to any such unifying and individualizing I’ precisely 
because ‘consciousness is defined by intentionality’. For Sartre (1972, p. 37), the very fact that 
the transcendental structure of consciousness is defined by intentionality means that there 
cannot be a ‘transcendental I’ or inner self that sits ‘behind each consciousness [as] a necessary 
structure of consciousness’. Following Husserl’s axiom that ‘all consciousness is 
consciousness of something’, Sartre (1972, p. 41) argues that transcendental consciousness is 
only consciousness by virtue of it being conscious of something which transcends 
 
7 See Gardner (2006, p. 248): ‘The level in Sartre’s philosophy that receives least attention – in English language 
commentary at any rate – is his ontology, his theory of being-in-itself, being-for-itself and nothingness.’ 
8 On the connections between the scholastic and Kantian conceptions of transcendentality, see Honnefelder (2003). 
9 In addition to the aforementioned works, see also Chabot (2016); Gillespie (2013); Gillespie (2014). 
10 For some recent considerations of Sartre as a (post-Kantian) ‘transcendental’ philosopher, see Webber (2018); 
Morris (2016); Gardner (2011). 
11 For a full discussion of Sartre’s critique of Husserl, see Webber (2020). 
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consciousness itself: ‘consciousness is not for itself its own object. Its object is by nature 
outside of it.’ 
Thus, if consciousness is conscious of an ‘I’ (e.g., when a conscious being consciously 
says ‘I think’), such an ‘I’ would by definition not be an ‘I’ that is transcendental. If a conscious 
being is conscious of an ‘I’, this ‘I’ would by definition be transcendent and not transcendental, 
it would be an object which transcends the consciousness of the conscious being – hence Sartre 
titles his essay The Transcendence of the Ego. For Sartre (1972, pp. 36, 41), transcendental 
consciousness is properly transcendental and conscious if and only if it is ‘without an I’: There 
is no room for an ‘I’ in consciousness. Anticipating his later characterisation of consciousness 
as ‘a total void (since the entire world is outside it)’ in Being and Nothingness (BN, p. 16/12/23; 
cf. BN, p. 9/7/17), Sartre writes in the conclusion of The Transcendence of the Ego: 
The transcendental field, purified of all egological structure, recovers its 
primary transparency. In a sense, it is a nothing [un rien], since all physical, 
psycho-physical, and psychical objects, all truths, and all values are outside it… 
But this nothing is everything [ce rien est tout] because it is the consciousness 
of all these objects. (Sartre, 1972, p. 93, translation modified) 
 
This characterisation of the transcendental as a universal structure applicable to ‘everything’ is 
one that very much echoes the pre-Kantian conception of transcendentals as universal 
properties of everything in medieval metaphysics: Indeed, as we shall further see below, there 
are remarkable parallels between Sartre’s account of the ‘not’ (non) and nothing(ness) (néant) 
in Being and Nothingness and the pre-modern notion of transcendentality in the scholastic 
account of the divine names of the one, the true, and the good.12 
 
12 Cf. Sartre (2010a, p. 281): ‘Bataille at times gives – and at times refuses – the name of God. It is a pure 
hypostatized nothingness [un pur néant hypostasié]… It is, in fact, one particular way of dissolving oneself into 
the nothing [le rien]. But that nothing is contrived in such a way that it becomes everything [Mais ce rien est 
habilement ménage de façon à être tout].’ See also Gardner (2011, p. 61): ‘The transcendental conception of 
consciousness is connected directly, therefore, with its specific ontological characterisation as nothingness: 
whatever is held to be transcendental cannot have anything of the character of an object – not even its being – and 
so, if it has existential status, must be “nothing(ness)”.’ 
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While there are some differences in his later understanding of transcendental 
subjectivity, Sartre still conceives of transcendentality in terms of nothing(ness) in Being and 
Nothingness (BN, pp. 159–162/127–129/139–141, 325/259/264; see also Gardner, 2009, pp. 
14–16, 90, 96, 99, 134–135). As its subtitle indicates, Being and Nothingness is not simply 
concerned with the transcendental structure of intentionality and consciousness: It is An Essay 
in Phenomenological Ontology that is concerned with both phenomenology and ontology – 
with both consciousness and being. Being and Nothingness, as Jonathan Webber (2018, pp. 
295–296) describes it, ‘concerns the ontological structure of reality itself as well as the 
ontological structure of our consciousness of reality’, a work in which Sartre ‘turn[s] his 
philosophical attention from the structures of experience to the structures of reality itself’.13 As 
such, Being and Nothingness may be regarded as a speculative philosophical treatise which 
presents an account of the ‘transcendental’ not just in the Kantian sense of being the conditions 
for subjective cognition or conscious experience – what Sartre calls the ‘phenomenon of 
knowledge’ (phénomène de connaissance), but also in the pre-Kantian sense of being the 
universal properties that can be predicated of all being – something very much similar to what 
Sartre calls ‘the structure of being’ (la structure de l’être) that is the focus of Being and 
Nothingness (see BN, p. 17/13/23). ‘Sartre’s claim in Being and Nothingness is, therefore,’ as 
Sebastian Gardner (2011, p. 59) notes, ‘that transcendental conditions must be construed 
ontologically.’ 
As opposed to Kant’s ‘modern’ account of the transcendental in the first Critique which 
is ‘occupied not so much with objects as with our mode of knowledge of objects’, pre-modern 
scholastic metaphysics (what Kant called the ‘transcendental philosophy of the ancients’) 
conceived of ‘transcendentals’ as the essential properties of things themselves (Kant, 1929, p. 
 
13 See also Webber (2020, p. 162): ‘in Being and Nothingness, the focus is on the being and structures of reality 
that do not depend on our experience of them… Sartre does not restrict the purview of his inquiry to the structures 
of experience.’ 
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59 [B25], emphasis added). As Kant notes in the first Critique, this ‘older’ transcendental 
philosophy is most famously expounded in the scholastic proposition ‘quodlibet ens est unum, 
verum, bonum’ – ‘every being is one, true, good’ (Kant, 1929, p. 118 [B113]). According to 
this medieval thesis, the terms of oneness, truth, and goodness are ‘transcendentals’ 
(transcendentalia), which are ‘common notions’ (communissima) that are universal properties 
of all things: They are called ‘transcendentals’ because they ‘transcend’ the Aristotelian 
categories in terms of their universal applicability. Insofar as ‘every being is one, true, good’, 
the notions of ‘oneness’, ‘truth’, and ‘goodness’ are said to be coextensive with ‘being’.14 
Unlike other predicates or adjectives such as ‘happy’, ‘blue’ or ‘runny’, each and every 
being can be predicated with ‘one’, ‘true’, and ‘good’. While it would be odd to say that a chair 
is ‘happy’, that a handshake is ‘blue’, or that a sentence is ‘runny’, all of these things could be 
predicated with the scholastic transcendentals. Everything can be said to be one insofar as they 
are a thing: every thing is one thing or indeed a unit with some level of unity or oneness (every 
chair is one chair, every handshake is one handshake, every sentence is one sentence). In a 
similar way, according to the scholastic medieval outlook, even if things are not fully or 
‘actually’ good, everything has the potency to be good. Thus, everything can be predicated 
with ‘goodness’ (‘that is a good chair’, ‘that is a good sentence’, “there is a good handshake”). 
Likewise, all things can be said to be ‘true’ – or, so to speak, ‘truthful’ (‘that is a true chair’, ‘a 
true sentence’, ‘a true handshake’): There is some level of truth in all things insofar as they 
(‘truly’) exist and are intelligible – that they contain some sense of ‘truth’. 
According to this scholastic outlook, insofar as oneness, truth and goodness are 
coextensive with being, there is a convertibility between these transcendental common terms. 
For instance, we can say that the true friend is also the good friend, and a good chair or a true 
 
14 This present account is obviously an extremely brief and simplified summary of a rich and complex tradition. 
For an in-depth and important study of the development of the medieval ‘classical’ conception of transcendentality, 
see Aertsen (2012). 
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chair would be a chair – one chair – that is whole and complete (as opposed to being incomplete, 
broken or indeed fragmented – not one). For the scholastics, this convertibility of the 
transcendentals is ultimately rooted and grounded in God: For God is supremely one, true, and 
good. God is the transcendent perfection and exemplary definition of oneness, truth, and 
goodness – the measure by which we measure the oneness, truth, and goodness of all created 
things: For scholastic thinkers such as Thomas Aquinas and his teacher Albert the Great, 
creatures and created things can be said to be one, true, or good only by virtue of their 
participation in God’s divine perfections – the so-called ‘divine names’ – of Oneness, Truth, 
and Goodness (Aertsen, 2012, pp. 674–675; see also Aertsen, 1996).15 
 As opposed to this scholastic theological outlook which saw God’s presence 
everywhere in the reflection of the transcendental properties of all things, Sartre was famously 
an avowed atheist, in his own words, someone with ‘a phobia about God who saw his absence 
everywhere’ (Sartre, 1967, p. 62). Indeed, in Being and Nothingness – Sartre’s self-declared 
attempt to develop a ‘truly atheist philosophy’ – we can find something akin to a direct opposite 
of scholastic theology: Instead of reflecting the divine perfections of oneness, truth, and 
goodness, in Sartre’s ontology all things signify the omni-absence of God (Beauvoir and Sartre, 
1985, p. 436, see also pp. 437–438). As we shall see in the following sections, the traditional 
divine names of God as the one, the true, the good are replaced by nothingness in Sartre’s 
atheistic ontological outlook: Whereas scholastic metaphysics saw God as the transcendent 
source of the oneness, truth, and goodness we find in the material world, ‘nothingness’ is 
defined as ‘the origin and foundation’ of the ‘not’ (non) which Sartre postulates as a universal 
predicate or even a universal condition of all determinate being.16 
 
15 Cf. Sartre’s critical remarks on this ‘theological’ identification of Being, the True, and the Good in his essay on 
‘Cartesian Freedom’ (Sartre, 2010b, pp. 513–516, especially p. 515). 
16 While Sartre’s remarks that nothingness comes into the world through human consciousness in Being and 
Nothingness (e.g., BN, pp. 58–59/47–48/57) may seem to suggest that Sartre’s a crypto-Kantian idealist who sees 
‘nothingness’ merely as a product of human subjectivity, it is important to note that Sartre explicitly insists that 
consciousness itself belongs to ‘being in general’ (BN, p. 29/23/33). As further discussed below, Sartre defines 
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3. Determination as negation 
Alluding repeatedly to what Hegel (1969, p. 113) called the ‘infinitely important’ proposition 
of Spinoza ‘omnis determinatio est negatio’ (‘all determination is negation’), in Being and 
Nothingness we find Sartre attributing a universal – or even ‘transcendental’ – predication of 
the ‘not’ or ‘nothingness’ to all things as determinate beings (BN, pp. 48/38/49, 261–
262/208/221, 572/458/480; cf. Gardner, 2009, p. 63). As Sartre writes in his section on 
‘Determination as Negation’ in Being and Nothingness: 
Indeed, we should be quite clear that we can only refer to this being right here 
as ‘this’ against the ground of the presence of all being… the this is disclosed 
as a this by the ‘withdrawal into the ground of the world’ of all the other thises; 
its determination – which is the origin of all determination – is a negation. (BN, 
pp. 256/203/216, 259/206/219) 
 
What makes a being a determinate being – what makes it this rather than that or those – is 
negation.17 Insofar as every concrete particular thing is not the abstract totality of all things 
(what Sartre calls ‘the ground of the world’ here) and that all things are determinate or indeed 
determinable – that each thing is intelligible as a potential ‘this’ as opposed to an indeterminate 
‘undifferentiated ground of being’ (BN, p. 258/205/218), every thing can be predicated with 
the ‘not’: Every thing is not everything.18 Every thing that can be determined as a this rather 
 
nothingness as ‘a structure of reality’ which manifests as ‘an objective fact and not a thought’ (BN, pp. 38/31/41, 
40/33/43) – nothingness is not a product of human judgment but an intrinsic part of the structure of being itself. 
This point is further elaborated below. 
17 See Gardner (2009, p. 62): ‘Sartre makes negation a transcendental condition of cognition: every concept and 
act of thought, Sartre argues, involves negation. Negation is presupposed in the application of any concept, either 
in individuating an object or in predicating something of it: to judge that X is F is to determine X as distinct from, 
i.e. not being the same as, Y, etc.’ However, as further argued below, ‘the not’ is for Sartre not just a transcendental 
condition of cognition, but also a transcendental property of being itself. See note 33 below. 
18 Conversely, ‘everything’ can also be predicated with the ‘not’: Everything is not some particular thing. If 
‘everything’ is, as Sartre submits (somewhat following Hegel), undifferentiated and indeterminate, then 
‘everything’ is precisely not differentiated and not determinate. See BN, pp. 255–263/203–209/216–222, also pp. 
44–50/36–40/46–51; cf. Sartre (1992, p. 483): ‘All of Being is there but enmeshed in a total undifferentiatedness. 
So Being is at the same time not being’ (Sartre’s emphasis). 
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than a that (‘it is this and not that’) – or indeed as a this rather than the whole world (‘it is this 
and not everything’) – can be universally predicated with a ‘not’.19 
 This predication of ‘not’ to things is precisely something we can find in the famous café 
scene in Being and Nothingness, where Sartre speaks of an ‘intuitive discovery’ of ‘the not’ (le 
non).20 To quote Sartre’s observation of Pierre’s absence from their scheduled appointment at 
some length:  
When I enter the café to look for Pierre, a synthetic organization of all the 
objects in the café is formed, against which Pierre is given as having to appear. 
And this organization of the café as a ground is a first nihilation. Each element 
in the room – person, table, chair – tries to separate itself, to detach itself against 
the ground constituted by the totality of the other objects, and then collapses 
back into that undifferentiated ground… I am the witness of the successive 
dissolution of every object which I look at, especially the faces, which detain 
me for a moment (‘Could that be Pierre?’) and immediately disperse, precisely 
because they ‘are not’ [«ne sont pas»]  Pierre’s face… The ‘not’ [Le non], as a 
sudden intuitive discovery, appears as the consciousness (of being) conscious 
of the ‘not’ [conscience du non]. (BN, pp. 41–44/33–35/44–46) 
 
The absence or ‘not’ of Pierre gives rise to the café observer’s awareness of the ‘are not’ of the 
various elements in the café: the persons and their faces ‘are not’ Pierre, the table is not Pierre, 
the chair is not Pierre, and indeed the café itself is also not Pierre.21 For Sartre, Pierre’s absence 
from the café is not a simple negation: It is not a subjective determination of a ‘this’ or ‘that’ 
but ‘an objective fact and not a thought’ (BN, p. 40/33/43). Pierre’s absence in the café is one 
which brings to our attention not only the subjective fact that the various entities in the café are 
not Pierre (as perceived by the observing subject), but also the objective fact that all determinate 
beings can be predicated with the not (non) insofar as they are not the abstract indeterminate 
totality of all things.22 
 
19  See also the comparison of Sartre’s account of nothingness to Derrida’s quasi-transcendental notion of 
différance in Howells (1988, pp. 194–201); cf. Toth (2007). 
20 For a compelling discussion of Sartre’s café passage as a critique of Bergson and its philosophical significance, 
see Richmond (2007). 
21 As the entirety of the café ‘remains as ground [which] continues to present itself to [the observer’s] marginal 
attention as an undifferentiated totality’ (BN, p. 42/34/44). 
22 Pierre’s absence is an instance of what Sartre calls négatités – ‘nothings’ or non-beings that have some concrete 
causal effects in the world (BN, p. 64/51/62). While Sartre’s account of ‘the objective existence of a non-being’ 
(BN, p. 36/29/39) has received much criticism (especially) from analytic philosophers, recent works in analytic 
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Inasmuch as Pierre’s phenomenological non-being highlights the ontological condition 
of determination as negation, for Sartre it is nothing less than a manifestation of nothingness 
as ‘a structure of reality, the origin and foundation of negation’: Just as Pierre’s non-being in 
the café is in some sense the ‘origin’ of the observer’s awareness and attribution of the ‘not’ to 
various beings in the café, ‘nothingness’ is ontologically speaking ‘the origin and foundation 
of negation’ which enables consciousness to apprehend and experience things as determinate 
beings – as opposed to an undifferentiated ground of indeterminate being (BN, p. 38/31/41). 
As Joseph Catalano (1985, p. 13) writes in his commentary on Being and Nothingness: ‘Only 
nothingness, for Sartre, can be perfectly clear and perfectly reveal reality.’ 
 To the extent that negation is understood ‘not as one thing among other things but as 
the rubric of a category that governs the organisation and division of great masses of being into 
things’, it may be said that for Sartre all determination – or even all ‘meaning’ – is predicated, 
conditioned and made possible by negation as a manifestation of nothingness (BN, p. 60/48/59, 
translation modified). Not unlike how transcendental perfections such as ‘oneness’, ‘truth’, and 
‘goodness’ are not ‘things among things’ but overarching universal properties which structure 
all existent things in scholastic metaphysics, Sartre’s ‘nothingness’ is a ‘rubric of a category’ 
which – transcendentally – ‘governs the organisation’ of all things: Just as all things may be 
predicated as ‘one’, ‘true’, or ‘good’ according to medieval scholasticism, for Sartre all 
 
philosophy have defended the perceivability or even causal efficacy of absences or non-beings. See, for instance, 
Jago (2014, pp. 144–151). For Sartre, négatités are mind-related or even seemingly mind-dependent: They 
‘originate in a human being’s act, or expectation, or project’ and humans ‘make continual use of négatités to 
isolate and determine the existents – in other words, to think them’ (BN, pp. 60/48/58, 64/51/62). However, 
négatités are also mind-independent ‘transcendent realities’ that are ‘dispersed throughout being’ which ‘possess 
as much reality and efficacy as other beings’ (BN, pp. 60/48/58, 57/45/56). As such, négatités are for Sartre 
‘conditions of reality’ (BN, p. 57/45/56) which signify the (negative) relation between the subjective mind and the 
objective world: ‘all of them underline an essential relation of human-reality with the world… all of them 
underline an aspect of being as it appears to a human being engaged within the world’ (BN, p. 60/48/58). The way 
in which négatités or non-beings reflect the negative relation between consciousness and being is further discussed 
in section four below. 
 11 
determinate beings can be predicated as ‘not’ insofar as they are not everything.23 But whereas 
the scholastic transcendentals refer and point back to God as the source of the oneness, truth, 
and goodness that is found in all being, Sartre’s universal predicate of the ‘not’ is one which 
‘refers back to’ (renvoyé) the ‘nothingness, as a structure of reality, the original and foundation 
of [all] negation’ (BN, p. 38/31/41).24 
 
4. The ontological proof of God’s non-being 
The way in which nothingness constitutes ‘a structure of reality’ is closely related to the 
premises Sartre lays out in his ‘ontological proof’ presented in the introduction to Being and 
Nothingness: ‘Consciousness is consciousness of something… consciousness arises oriented 
towards a being that it is not. Let us call this the ontological proof’ (BN, p. 22/17/28, translation 
modified). Echoing his earlier argument against Husserl that the ego is not identical to 
transcendental consciousness as the ego is a transcendent being which we can be conscious of, 
in Being and Nothingness Sartre insists that insofar as a consciousness is conscious of some 
being, that being is by definition not the said consciousness (BN, p. 27/21/32). 
 As such, there is a negative ontological relation between consciousness (what Sartre 
calls the ‘for-itself’) and the thing which it is conscious of (the ‘in-itself’): 
What is present to me is not me… It is impossible to construct the notion of an 
object if there is not originally a negative relation by which the object is 
designated as that which is not consciousness… Before any comparison or any 
construction, a thing has to be present to consciousness as not being 
consciousness. The original relation of presence, as the foundation of 
knowledge, is negative… through the original negation, the for-itself constitutes 
itself as not being the thing. (BN, pp. 247–248/196–197/210, translation 
modified) 
 
23 Just as medieval ‘transcendentals’ are said to ‘transcend’ the Aristotelian categories in terms of their universality, 
Sartre’s account of negation as a ‘rubric of a category’ (une rubrique catégorielle) may also be understood as a 
transcategorial notion which ‘transcends’ – or indeed ‘preside over’ – the level of ‘category’. 
24 One may compare Sartre’s notion of ‘renvoyé’ to Aquinas’s ‘return’ (reditus) in his account of transcendental 
properties of creatures as reflections of God as their origin and end in De Veritate, XX.4: ‘all things proceed from 
God into being, and… are ordained to God as to their end.… just as creatures would be imperfect if they proceeded 
from God and were not ordained to return to God, so, too, their procession from God would be imperfect unless 
the return [reditio] to God were equal to the procession’ (Aquinas, 1994b, pp. 412–413). 
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For Sartre, this ‘original’ negative relation between the in-itself and for-itself implies that the 
existence of some conscious being (the for-itself) logically entails that there is some existent 
being which it is conscious of – a transcendent being that is not consciousness (the in-itself) 
(see BN, pp. 20–23/16–18/26–29). Although it is debateable whether such a line of argument 
really constitutes an ‘ontological proof’ for the existence of the in-itself, one thing is clear: 
Sartre’s ‘ontological proof’ is deliberately named as a subversion of the ‘ontological’ 
arguments for the existence of God as found in Anselm and Descartes (see BN, p. 7/6/16). 
Indeed, Sartre’s ‘ontological proof’ may be said to be nothing less than an atheistic 
argument against the existence of God (see Beauvoir and Sartre, 1985, p. 437; see also Gellman, 
2009, p. 132; cf. Kirkpatrick, 2013, p. 162). As we have just seen, at the heart of Sartre’s 
‘ontological proof’ is the negative relation between the for-itself and the in-itself.25 The in-
itself is by definition not the for-itself, the two ontological categories are strictly mutually 
exclusive: there cannot be a being that is both in-itself and for-itself – what Sartre calls an ‘in-
itself-for-itself, i.e. an in-itself that would be its own foundation in relation to itself’ (BN, p. 
480/384/402). To quote a well-known passage from Being and Nothingness: 
the in-itself-for-itself [is] the ideal of a consciousness that could be the 
foundation of its own being-in-itself purely by means of its own being conscious 
of itself. To this ideal, we can give the name ‘God’. So we can say the best way 
to conceive of human-reality’s fundamental project is to regard man as the being 
whose project is to be God. (BN, pp. 735/587/611–612) 
 
The ‘in-itself-for-itself’ is regarded by Sartre as the ‘ideal of the for-itself’ because it is within 
the intentional character of consciousness for-itself to wish to fully grasp and comprehend the 
in-itself which it is not. 
 
25 See King (1974, p. 64): ‘God is not possible for ontological reasons. The ontological reasons would be sort of 
a reverse form of St. Anselm’s ontological argument. St. Anselm, by a logical analysis of the definition of God, 
wanted to show that God must exist by the very definition of what was meant by God. In Being and Nothingness 
the atheism of Sartre does the reverse: by a logical analysis of the definition of God – that is, by a consideration 
of the opposing properties [of the in-itself and for-itself] – Sartre mains that God is contradictory and therefore 
cannot exist.’ 
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However, human consciousness’s wish to fully grasp and comprehend being in-itself 
and ‘to metamorphose its own For-itself into an In-itself-for-itself’ – to transform oneself into 
what Sartre calls ‘God’ – is inherently futile: Such a wish to become God is, in Sartre’s famous 
words, ‘a useless passion’ (BN, p. 797/636/662). As we have seen, according to the original 
negative ontological relation on which Sartre bases his ontological proof, it is impossible to 
attain a complete unity or coincidence of the for-itself and in-itself: if the for-itself could fully 
grasps the in-itself, it would by definition no longer be for-itself – as there will no longer be a 
transcendent being in-itself for it be conscious of. Without anything to be conscious of, the for-
itself can no longer exist as consciousness.26 
For Sartre, the for-itself’s ‘mission to make the in-itself-for-itself exist’ – to ‘become 
God’ – is ‘doomed, by definition, to failure’ (BN, p. 810/646/675). This is not just because the 
for-itself would cease to exist should it become in-itself-for-itself, but moreover because the 
very existence of God qua in-itself-for-itself is (onto)logically ‘impossible’: 
[The in-itself-for-itself would be an absolute being] whose existence would be 
the unitary synthesis of the in-itself and of consciousness – this ideal being 
would be the in-itself as founded by the for-itself, and identical to the for-itself 
who founds it; in other words, it would be the ens causa sui… the indissoluble 
totality of in-itself and for-itself is conceivable only in the form of a being that 
is ‘its own cause’… [But] this ens causa sui is impossible, and, as we saw, its 
concept contains a contradiction. (BN, p. 805/642/671) 
 
Although the account of God as causa sui was one that was explicitly rejected in scholastic 
theology (for God is ‘uncaused’), Sartre’s formulation of God qua in-itself-for-itself as the 
‘unitary synthesis of the in-itself and consciousness’ is nonetheless broadly in line with the 
traditional theological doctrine of divine simplicity.27 
 
26 For a detailed explication of this point, see Bantel (1979); cf. Wang (2009, pp. 267–273). 
27 Cf. Crittenden (2012, p. 499): ‘Sartre would have derived the term ens causa sui as a name of God from 
Descartes’ Meditations, for scholastic theologians, as Descartes acknowledged, all rejected the term. In the second 
of his five “ways”, Aquinas observes that “We never find, nor ever could, that something is the efficient cause of 
itself, for this would mean it preceded itself, and this is not possible” [Summa Theologiae, I.2.3]… Duns Scotus 
and William of Ockham, critics of Aquinas on many issues, explicitly agreed with him in this regard.’ 
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 According to this classical theological doctrine, God is his own being (esse): God’s 
essence is simply his existence – what God is is that God is.28 One of the implications of the 
principle of divine simplicity – that God’s essence and being are identical – is the scholastic 
teaching that God’s act of understanding is identical with God’s being: ‘in God to be and to 
understand are one and the same’ (Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I.14.4, sed contra). To quote 
Thomas Aquinas: 
Whatever is in God is the divine essence. God’s act of understanding, therefore, 
is His essence, it is the divine being, God Himself. For God is His essence and 
His being… God’s understanding [intelligere] is His being [esse]. (Summa 
Contra Gentiles, I.45, as translated in Aquinas, 1975, pp. 173–174) 
 
In this theological outlook, in God we find a perfect identity of being and understanding – or 
as the theologian David Bentley Hart (2013, p. 235) puts it in phenomenological terminology, 
God ‘is in himself the absolute unity of consciousness and being’. What this means 
metaphysically is that as finite creatures human beings only comprehend things insofar as they 
are drawn towards the perfect coincidence of being and understanding of God as the archè and 
telos of all being and consciousness (Hart, 2013, pp. 228–234, especially p. 231; cf. Aquinas, 
De Veritate, I.8). 
 Such a divine unity of being and consciousness – or what Sartre calls the in-itself and 
for-itself – is precisely an ‘impossible and constantly indicated fusion of essence and existence’ 
that ‘haunts the for-itself’ as it calls the for-itself to aspire to a state of being it could never 
attain (BN, pp. 273/217/230–231). Whereas scholastic theology believes that the non-
coincidence of essence and existence in the finite immanent world points towards the 
 
28  See, for instance, Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, I.21–22, and Summa Theologiae, I.3.4. Cf. Sartre’s 
question in BN, p. 143/114/126: ‘Is not God a being who is what he is’ [un étre qui est ce qu’il est]?’ Here Sartre 
further speaks of God as ‘the necessary foundation of himself’, also echoing the traditional theological principle 
of divine aseity – that God is ‘of himself’ (a se) because God is uncaused (and therefore cannot be causa sui). See 
Crittenden (2012, pp. 499–500): ‘[Scholastic metaphysics] referred to God as ens a se, meaning that God’s being 
is absolute or unconditioned, a being existing “from itself” or “by itself” (by its own power). This was ordinarily 
taken in a negative sense to mean that God is not conditioned or caused by anything. But Descartes went beyond 
this to argue that the phrase a se could also be understood in a positive sense… that “[God] is in a sense his own 
cause”… [through this] the term ens causa sui entered philosophy.’ 
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transcendent unity of essence and existence in God, for Sartre the disunity of essence and 
existence of things in the world signifies instead ‘a missing God’ (BN, p. 805/643/671), a 
‘constantly absent being which haunts the for-itself’ (BN, p. 142/114/126). As opposed to the 
in-itself-for-itself operating as an ‘ideal fusion’ of consciousness and being which we find in 
traditional theological metaphysics, what Sartre’s ontological proof underscores and articulates 
is the intrinsic disconnection between the for-itself and in-itself which marks the ‘universal 
absence’ (absence universelle) of God (Sartre, 1988, p. 20). Instead of finding a reflection of 
God’s oneness, truth, and goodness in the transcendental properties of all things, what Sartre 
presents in his ontology is an atheistic outlook in which the ‘absence of God was to be read 
everywhere’ (Beauvoir and Sartre, 1985, p. 435). 
The universal absence or ‘omni-absence’ of God is precisely that which underlies 
Sartre’s aforementioned attribution of the ‘not’ to all things. 29  Although the medieval 
scholastics did consider the predicate ‘not’ (non) as a ‘transcategorial’ term insofar as the 
universality of its predication transcends the Aristotelian categories, the ‘not’ was emphatically 
not included among the transcendentals (Aertsen, 2012, p. 43). This is because whereas 
transcendental properties such as the one, the true, and the good always point towards some 
definite – and definitive – perfection, the predicate or the determination of the ‘not’ is indefinite. 
In other words, the ‘not’ (non) does not point to any concrete determinate qualities or properties 
– as Jan Aertsen (2012, pp. 29–30) notes in his important study of medieval transcendentality, 
‘indefinite names’ (nomina infinita) or indeterminate predicates such as the ‘not’ (non) ‘signify 
“nothing” (nihil) in the sense that do not signify any determinate matter, and “everything” 
(omnia), insofar as they are applicable to all matters’.30  
 
29 For Sartre, to ‘say no’ (dire non) to being (in-itself) may be regarded as an implicit rejection of God. See Sartre 
(2010b, p. 516): ‘[God] is the author responsible for everything in me that is. But by my finitude and limitedness, 
by my shadow side, I turn away from Him… To all these nothings, I can, as a nothing myself, say no [A tous ces 
nèant, néant moi-même, je puis dire non].’ 
30 Here Aertsen cites Aquinas’s teacher Albert the Great’s commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytic. 
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In a sense, the medieval account of the ‘not’ as an indefinite name that does not name 
or signify any definite being is not dissimilar to a point made by A. J. Ayer in his early critique 
of Sartre’s treatment of nothingness in Being and Nothingness. Echoing Carnap’s famous 
criticism of Heidegger’s assertion that ‘Nothing nihilates itself’, Ayer writes: 
The point is that words like ‘nothing’ and ‘nobody’ are not used as the names 
of something insubstantial and mysterious; they are not used to name anything 
at all. What Sartre does, however, is to say that, being separated by Nothing, the 
objects are both united and divided. There is a thread between them; only, it is 
a very peculiar thread, both invisible and intangible. But this is a trick that 
should not deceive anyone. The confusion is then still further increased by the 
attempt to endow Nothing with an activity, the fruit of which is found in such 
statements as Heidegger’s ‘das Nichts nichtet’ and Sartre’s ‘le Néant est 
néantisé’. For whatever may be the affective value of these statements, I cannot 
but think that they are literally nonsensical. (Ayers, 1945, pp. 18–19) 
 
According to Ayer, Sartre treats ‘nothing’ as if it were an entity or some reified being. However, 
as Sarah Richmond (2013, p. 98) points out, such objections are anticipated by Sartre in Being 
and Nothingness when he insists that ‘we cannot concede to nothingness the property of  
“nihilating itself”… only being can nihilate itself, because for something nihilate itself it is 
necessary, in some way or other, for it to be. [But] nothingness is not’ (BN, p. 58/46/57). 
 Sartre’s néant refers not to some reified being but to the gap or indeed the ‘Nothing’ 
that – as Ayer says – ‘separates’ the in-itself and for-itself (see BN, pp. 65/52/63, 128/102/114). 
As we saw earlier in Being and Nothingness, ‘nothingness’ must not be understood as ‘one 
thing among other things’ (BN, p. 60/48/59). Sartre’s ‘nothingness’ refers not to a being but to 
a relation – to the ontological relation of not: that the for-itself is not the in-itself, a relation 
which only the for-itself (and not the in-itself) is aware or indeed conscious of.31 As such, in 
Sartre’s ontological schema, the determinate predicate of ‘not’ may be said to function as a 
transcendental because it does signify something definite (and definitive) that is beyond the 
concrete phenomenal entities: namely, the non-coincidence of consciousness and being, the 
 
31 It is for this reason that Sartre says that the conscious human for-itself is ‘the being through whom nothingness 
comes into the world’, even though nothingness ultimately has its ontological origin in being in-itself. See note 
16 above. 
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original negative ontological relation between the in-itself and for-itself.32 Unlike the ‘real’ 
absence of Pierre or what Sartre calls the ‘abstract’ absence of the Duke of Wellington and 
Paul Valéry from the café, God’s absolute absence is ontological and not just ontic (BN, pp. 
42–43/34–35/45). As opposed to the ‘ontic’ or ‘relative’ absences of Wellington, Valéry, or 
indeed Pierre, the absolute absence of God is not just the non-being or non-appearance of an 
(ontic) entity, but a definite and definitive ontological necessity (cf. Gardner, 2009, pp. 204–
205). 
The necessary non-being of God (which marks the negative ontological relation 
between the in-itself and for-itself as well as the ontological impossibility of any absolute 
coincidence between being and consciousness) is for Sartre the ontological – or even 
transcendental – condition which enables consciousness to apprehend being: The for-itself can 
only be conscious of being because it does not coincide with – that it is not – being in-itself.33 
As opposed to reflecting the perfect unity of being and intelligibility represented by God – 
what Sartre calls the ‘ideal fusion’ of in-itself-for-itself, the ‘not’ (non) which Sartre attributes 
to all determinate being is one which signifies the nihil, the non-being of God which represents 
the absence and impossibility of any perfect coincidence between being and consciousness (cf. 
Beauvoir and Sartre, 1985, p. 442). The universal predicate of the ‘not’ signifies that God is 
 
32 Although Sartre clearly differs from Heidegger in insisting that Nothing cannot nihilate itself, Sartre’s account 
of the original negative ontological relation could be seen as an (atheistic) appropriation of Heidegger’s 
‘ontological difference’ between Being and beings as the starting point of ontology. Cf. Heidegger (1998, p. 97): 
‘The nothing is the “not” of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings. The ontological 
difference is the “not” between beings and Being. Yet just as Being, as the “not” in relation to beings, is by no 
means a nothing in the sense of a nihil negativum, so too the difference, as the “not” between beings and Being, 
is in no way merely the figment of a distinction made by our understanding.’ 
33 Following Gardner’s aforementioned suggestion that ‘Sartre makes negation a transcendental condition of 
cognition’ (note 17 above), it may be noted that this ‘transcendental condition’ of cognitive negation is reflective 
of – and indeed correlated to – the ‘not’ as an ontological relation. See Gardner (2005, p. 330): ‘[For Sartre,] the 
fulfilment of cognitive conditions is a necessary correlate of the ontological relation… a negative ontological 
relation.’ 
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not, 34   that it is not God but nothingness (nihil) that is the origin of all meaning and 
determination.35 
However, unlike the scholastics’ God, Sartre’s nothingness is not the uncaused cause 
and origin of all being and their transcendental properties. As we just saw, Sartre insists that 
nothingness cannot nihilate itself and only being can nihilate itself: nothingness can only come 
about through the nihilation of being.36 As such, for Sartre, nothingness has its origin in being 
and fundamentally derives its existence from being: 
being is antecedent to nothingness and founds it… it is from being that 
nothingness derives its efficacy. We express this by saying that nothingness 
haunts being… the nothingness that is not can have only a borrowed existence: 
it takes its being from being. (BN, pp. 50/40/50–51) 
 
Even though Sartre does not provide a reason or explanation for the emergence of nothingness 
in Being and Nothingness,37 from this passage we can see that it is within the capacities or even 
the character of being in-itself to nihilate or negate itself to bring into existence the for-itself, 
which in turn introduces nothingness into the world of determinate beings through negations: 
Although Sartre holds that nothingness arrives in the world through (par) consciousness, 
nothingness ultimately has a pre-subjective source in being itself.38 
 
34 On the paradoxicality of this positive signification of an absence, see the analysis of Sartre’s ‘paradoxical logic 
of nothingness’ in Toth (2007). See also the discussion of the paradoxical way in which ‘God is present through 
his absence’ throughout Sartre’s atheistic philosophy in Gillespie (2013; 2014). 
35 As such, Sartre’s nothingness parallels the way in which God is posited as the source of truth and intelligibility 
in scholastic metaphysics. See Sartre’s (1995, p. 20) remarks on the structure of truth in an essay written five 
years after Being and Nothingness: ‘Non-Being intervenes directly as structure of truth… truth is a certain non-
being of Being… Nothingness intervenes in truth.’ See also note 40 below. 
36 Cf. Sartre (1992, pp. 150–151): ‘Being-in-itself has to being about its own negation… Being already has a sort 
of existence at the extreme tip of Nothingness. It cannot come from Nothingness, therefore it must already be in 
some way in order to uphold Nothingness in its being. The result is that finally it is Being that upholds the 
Nothingness that must found it. So that it finally comes down to saying that Being is either beyond or on this side 
of Nothingness.’ See also Sartre (1992, p. 520).  
37 Sartre notes that the question of ‘why’ the for-itself arises from being is a ‘metaphysical’ – as opposed to 
‘ontological’ – problem, which lies beyond the ‘ontological’ concerns of Being and Nothingness as an essay on 
phenomenological ontology. See BN, pp. 800–803/639–640/667–669. See the fascinating analysis of Sartre’s 
distinction between ontology and metaphysics in relation to his atheism and Schelling’s so-called ‘onto-theology’ 
in Gardner (2006); cf. King (1974, p. 41). 
38 See Gardner (2011, p. 56): ‘A metaphysical position which attributes the constitution of the objects of cognition 
to the structure of the subject, and which, like Kant, stops the story at that point, counts straightforwardly as a 
subjective idealism. But if the structures are traced back in turn to a pre-subjective source – such that, when the 
subject posits objects, its positing of objects derives ultimately, albeit indirectly, from being itself – then it is not 
so obvious that we have an idealism, or at any rate, that we have an idealism of Kant’s subjective sort. And on 
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As such, Sartre’s notion of ‘nothing(ness)’ operates as a transcendental in the sense of 
being ‘the structure of experience’ (à la Kantian transcendentality) as well as ‘the ontological 
structure of reality itself’ (à la scholastic transcendentality).39 Nothingness is for Sartre not just 
a product or feature of human consciousness and cognition, but a mind-independent dimension 
of reality that is embedded in being itself – even if it is one that needs human consciousness 
(or what scholastics call the intellectus) to be ‘noted or felt’ (BN, p. 64/51/62; see also Gardner, 
2011, p. 56).40 As a reflection of the negative ontological relation which underlies all being, 
the ‘not’ operates as a transcendental property that is found in each and every determinate being: 
‘The necessary condition for the possibility of saying “not” is that non-being should be 
constantly present, within us and outside us, that nothingness should haunt being’ (BN, p. 
44/35/46). Just as being is ‘haunted’ by nothingness, the ‘not’ is for Sartre an atheistic 
transcendental which conditions, structures, and indeed ‘haunts’ all determinate being. Parallel 
to the way in which the transcendental properties of oneness, truth, and goodness refer to the 
perfect coincidence of being and consciousness which scholastic theology calls ‘God’, in 
Sartre’s ontology we find the transcategorial predicate of the ‘not’ (non) playing the role of a 
transcendental which signifies the nihil – the nothingness which marks the ‘universal absence’ 




Sartre’s full metaphysical account… this is exactly the picture – when the subject bestows structure on being-in-
itself, yielding an intelligibly differentiated world of objects, it follows an imperative which derives in the last 
resort from being itself.’ 
39 This point could be illustrated by Sartre’s notion of négatités which function like Kant’s ‘regulative concepts’ 
that enable us ‘to isolate and determine existents – i.e., to think them’, but are also ‘conditions of reality’ that are 
‘dispersed in being’ (BN, pp. 56/45/57, 64/51/62). Cf. Webber (2018, pp. 295–296). See also note 22 above. 
40 Cf. Aquinas’s remarks on the transcendental character of ‘truth’ in De Veritate, I.2, resp. and ad. 1 (Aquinas, 
1994a, pp. 11–12): ‘A thing is not called true, however, unless it confirms to an intellect. The true, therefore, is 
found secondarily in things and primarily in intellect… true is predicated primarily of a true intellect and 
secondarily of a thing confirmed will intellect. True taken in either sense, however, is interchangeable with being, 
but in different ways.’ 
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As mentioned above, Sartre remarks later in his life that his project in Being and Nothingness 
was an endeavour to develop a ‘truly atheist philosophy’ through which ‘the absence of God 
was to be read everywhere’ (Beauvoir and Sartre, 1985, pp. 435–436). This avowed atheism is 
something which underlies both Sartre’s early critique of Husserl’s transcendental 
phenomenology as well as his more developed ontological schema in Being and Nothingness.41 
As we saw in section one’s discussion of The Transcendence of the Ego, Sartre insists on the 
impossibility of the existence of any transcendental ‘I’. As Gardner (2009, p. 15) points out, 
‘Sartre’s expunging of Husserl's transcendental “I” is to establish a kind of atheism of 
consciousness’. Indeed, the atheistic elements of Sartre’s rendition of a transcendental 
consciousness ‘without an I’ are notable when we consider Sartre’s rejection of Husserl’s 
transcendental ego in light of the definition of God as the impossible ideal unity of the for-
itself and in-itself – of the conscious knower and the being that is known – given in Being and 
Nothingness: If the ego could be transcendental consciousness (the for-itself) and 
simultaneously something that the said consciousness is conscious of (the in-itself), the 
‘transcendental ego’ would therefore be a God-like unity of in-itself-for-itself, which for Sartre 
is strictly impossible (cf. King, 1974, pp. 69–71). 
In addition to ‘removing God from the cogito’ through his phenomenological rendition 
of human consciousness for-itself as a transcendental nothing (Kirkpatrick, 2017, p. 129),42 as 
we further saw in the discussion of Being and Nothingness in sections two and three, Sartre’s 
ontological attribution of the ‘not’ (non) to all determinate beings also functions an atheistic 
 
41 See Sartre (1962, p. 200): ‘I did not consider myself to be any the less a metaphysician in refusing existence to 
God than Leibnitz was in granting it to Him.’ 
42 See also Sartre (2010b, p. 515): ‘[T]he human being is nothing [un nèant]. It is by his nothingness, and inasmuch 
as he has dealings with Nothingness, Evil and Error that man escapes God, for God, who is infinite fullness of 
being, cannot either conceive or govern nothingness.’ For Sartre, there is a latent atheist dimension to Descartes’ 
cogito: ‘I can bracket out all existents and I am exercising my freedom to the full when I, myself an empty 
nothingness, void everything that exists [je néantis tout ce qui existe]. Doubt is a breaking of contact with being… 
Being this pure negation, … man isn’t a “natural” being: But at the point when he achieves this unparalleled 
independence… against God, he catches himself being pure nothingness: over against the being that is entirely 
bracketed out, all that remains is a mere no… it is this translucent rejection of everything that is itself attained in 
the cogito’ (Sartre, 2010b, pp. 516–518). 
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structure of being that ‘transcendentally’ signifies the nothingness (nihil) which marks the 
omni-absence of God. Contrary to the theological outlook of medieval scholastic metaphysics, 
for Sartre, being is not one, true, or good, but instead intrinsically and irredeemably godless. 
By giving ‘nothing(ness)’ a transcendental status – in both the Kantian and pre-Kantian 
scholastic sense of transcendentality, what we find in Sartre’s Being and Nothingness is not 
only a subversion of the traditional metaphysical conception of the transcendentals and divine 
names but moreover an ontological outlook in which the non-being of God is reflected in each 
and every determinate being.43 
While it may be (rightly) argued that Sartre’s postulation of the non-being and absence 
of God in his ontology is fundamental to securing the radical freedom of the conscious human 
being for-itself, Sartre’s atheistic insistence on God’s inexistence is not motivated solely by his 
(ethico-political) commitment to human freedom, but also (and perhaps more fundamentally) 
informed by his phenomenological and ontological account of the structures of conscious 
experience and the structures of being itself which derives from Husserl’s axiom that ‘all 
consciousness is conscious of something’.44 As such, what we find in Sartre is not just an 
innovative unification of phenomenology and ontology, but also by extension a harmonisation 
of the Kantian subjective and pre-Kantian scholastic ‘pre-subjective’ accounts of 
transcendentality. 
By considering Sartre’s ontological schema in relation to the speculative theological 
metaphysics of pre-Kantian and indeed pre-modern scholastic philosophy, this article has 
offered a reading of Sartre’s philosophical project as a bold and innovative endeavour in 
developing a ‘systematic transcendental metaphysics’ from ‘a consistently atheistic position’ 
 
43 Perhaps Sartre’s (1988, p. 28) remarks on Mallarmé may also be applicable to Sartre himself: ‘Whereas they 
had adored God’s presence… [and] depicted a Universe glowing with Divine Light; he shall portray a world 
where this light is extinguished, a world in shadow… They had sung the praises of the intelligible world of Beauty, 
of absolute Truth… like them, he shall also speak about the Beautiful and the Ideal, but for him it is the Absolute 
which seems but a dream.’ 
44 Cf. Kirkpatrick’s (2018, pp. 4, 210) argument that Sartre’s atheism is ‘a theologically informed atheism’. 
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(cf. Sartre, 1973, p. 56; Gardner, 2005, p. 327). Interpreting Sartre’s work from this perspective 
can not only contribute some new insights to the contemporary discussions on ontology and 
metaphysics,45 seeing Sartre as a creative and avowedly atheist (re)interpreter of traditional 
metaphysical theses that had been broadly theistically construed (be it Anselm’s and 
Descartes’s ontological proof or Spinoza’s and Hegel’s omnis determinatio est negatio) can 
moreover shed some light on our understanding of the intricate boundary between philosophy 
and theology.46 As Sartre himself remarked, to live authentically as an atheist is a ‘cruel’ and 
difficult business: ‘It’s hard. Even those who think they have succeeded in becoming conscious, 
deliberate atheists are certainly still imbued with divine notions’ (Sartre, 1967, p. 157).47 
Whether one finds his ambitious attempt to construct a systematic – or even somewhat 
‘scholastic’ – atheist metaphysics successful or not, perhaps one cannot help but be impressed 
by Sartre’s bold and forceful effort to philosophically affirm that ‘God does not exist’ and 
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